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THE CHANGING FACE OF GENERAL AVIATION
SECURITY REGULATION: WHAT IS BEING DONE, WHAT
NEEDS TO BE DONE, AND WHY DOES ANYTHING
NEED TO BE DONE IN THE FIRST PLACE?
REBECCA TILLERY*
IN JANUARY 2002, a teenage flight student crashed a small
airplane into a downtown Tampa skyscraper.1 Then, in May
2005, a small airplane violated restricted airspace over Washing-
ton D.C. and flew within three miles of the White House, caus-
ing evacuations there and at the Capitol.2 Just months later, a
Connecticut man stole a plane from a nearby flight school and
took it on a midnight joyride.' Lastly, in October 2005, a private
business jet was stolen from a Florida airport, only to land in
Georgia 300 miles away, after the alleged thief had completed
his late-night adventure.' While none of these events have been
linked to terrorism, they point to continuing security vulnerabil-
ities at general aviation 5 ("GA") airports and showcase the rela-
tive ease in acquiring GA aircraft.
Other government and agency reports do however link GA
and terrorism. Intelligence confirms that the September 11 ("9-
11") hijackers learned to fly at United States flight schools, a
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2007; B.B.A., University of
Texas at Austin 2003. I would like to thank my father Tim Tillery for being such
a tremendous role model.
I U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-1150T, AVIATION SECURITY: PRO-
CRESS SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001, AND THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 14 (2003) [herein-
after AvIATION SECURITY: PROGRESS].
2 NBC4.com, Capitol, White House Evacuated Briefly As Plane Enters Air-
space, http://www.nbc4.com/news/4476434/detail.html (last visited Mar. 22,
2006).
3 BART ELIAS, SECURING GENERAL AVIATION 10 (Cong. Research Serv., CRS Re-
port for Congress Order Code RL33194, Dec. 15, 2005) [hereinafter SECURING
GENERAl. AxIATION].
4 Id. at 10-11.
5 General Aviation is generally defined as the aviation operations not per-
formed by scheduled commercial airlines, large air cargo companies, or the mili-
tary. Id. at 2.
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large component of the GA industry, and considered using
small planes to accomplish their mission.6 These vulnerabilities
persist. In fact, an alarming Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI")/Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") report
from February 2005 detailed particular vulnerabilities in what it
called "the largely unregulated" area of GA.7
So what is being done to improve GA security? A congres-
sional watchdog agency found that since 9-11, the Transporta-
tion Security Administration ("TSA"), the agency responsible
for all civil aviation security, "has taken limited action to im-
prove general aviation security leaving [it] far more open and
potentially vulnerable than commercial aviation."8 Current GA
security policy focuses on providing general, voluntary guide-
lines and executing joint projects between the TSA and GA in-
dustry groups. These existing measures are woefully inadequate
and must be built upon and expanded to truly protect this in-
dustry from those who wish to exploit it.
As 2005 drew to a close, however, GA finally attracted policy-
makers' attention, resulting in the introduction of two new bills
that would substantially upgrade GA security measures. This
Comment attempts to shed light on the issues that the legislative
and administrative bodies should consider while trying to secure
and regulate such a diverse industry. It questions whether ei-
ther bill would be effective and proposes that a successful solu-
tion must create a risk-based system that is cognizant of the cost
of securing an industry as complex and varied as GA.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of the GA
industry, in part, to illustrate the challenges in designing secur-
ity programs. Part II takes an extensive look at security mea-
sures already in place and whether they are working. Part III
demonstrates that, contrary to some beliefs, GA threatens our
national security. Finally, Part IV explains how the GA security
bills currently under consideration fall short of implementing a
6 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-144, GENERAL AVIATION SECUR-
ITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT Is NEEDED, BUT CONTINUED PARTNERSHIP WITH
THE PRIVATE SECTOR IS CRITICAL TO LONG-TERM SUCCESS 16 (2004) [hereinafter
GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT].
7 Eric Lichtblau, Government Report On U.S. Aviation Warns of Holes, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2005, at Al.
8 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-23 2T, AVIATION SECURITY: EFFORTS




risk-based, cost-efficient framework and suggests alternative se-
curity plans.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY
GA is something with which many Americans will never come
into contact, yet it accounts for three fourths of all aircraft that
take off and land in the United States. Additionally, GA aircraft
fly over 27 million hours each year, nearly two times the amount
of commercial aviation flight hours.' GA benefits those that
use GA transportation services and also the economy in general.
Estimates vary as to GA's contribution to the national economy,
but some figures put the data as high as $100 billion per year
and 1.3 million jobs." GA boosts businesses' efficiency with
faster travel times and also provides public services, like trans-
porting the sick and injured and monitoring fires and floods. 12
GA provides necessary transportation to small communities that
do not have access to commercial air carriers.'" In fact, more
than 5,000 communities rely exclusively on GA for their air
transportation needs, while scheduled airlines serve less than
500 communities. 4 In other words, "[g]eneral aviation air-
planes bring economic development to our rural communities
and take corporations to places where they wouldn't otherwise
operate." 15
A. GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT AND OPERATIONS
If asked to picture the typical GA aircraft, most people would
probably think of a small, single-engine plane,'" but the 211,000
active GA aircraft include jets, helicopters, and experimental air-
9 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-916, GENERAL AVIATION: STATUS OF
THE INDUSTRY, RELATED INFRASTRUCTURE, AND SAFETY ISSUES 2 (2001) [hereinafter
GENERAL, AVIATION: STATUS].
W General Aviation Manufacturers Association ("GAMA"), Industry Facts &
Statistics, http://www.gama.aero/mediaCenter/mediaGuide/industrvFacts.php?
PHPSESSID=9070d698bfb84acaec2d91bf68499705 (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
II GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6, at
1.
'2 GENERAL AVIATION: STATUS, supra note 9, at 13.
13 Id.
14 GAMA, What Is GA?, http://www.gama.aero/aboutGAMA/whatIsGA.php
(last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
15 Opening Reagan National Airport to General Aviation: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Aviation of the H. Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure, 108th Cong. 17
(2004) [hereinafter Hearing] (testimony of Edward M. Bolen, President, GAMA).
"1 And they usually would be correct since the single-engine piston airplane
makes up 69% of the GA fleet. SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 4.
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craft, along with those single-engine planes owned by recrea-
tional fliers and hobbyists. 17 GA aircraft can vary tremendously in
size and weight (and therefore also in potential destructive
power). For example, most single-engine planes weigh less than
5,000 pounds while large business jets can weigh as much as
100,000 pounds.18 Although these large jets make up only about
4% of the GA fleet today, reports forecast that this segment of
the industry will grow at a rapid pace of 6% each year for the
next ten years.19
GA involves a diverse range of flight operations such as per-
sonal and family transportation, power line inspection and re-
pair, training, medical supplies transportation, emergency
services, agricultural aviation, and law enforcement.20 The larg-
est GA use category is personal flying.2' In fact, 41 % of all GA
hours flown are for personal flying.22 Instructional flying is the
next largest use category, amounting to 16.1% of GA hours
flown z.2  Corporate and business flying24 combined is nearly one
quarter of GA operations.2 5 Corporate and business flying can
account for anything from "small businesses flying cancelled
checks or regional salesmen flying to customer sites in small sin-
gle-engine aircraft, to companies ferrying crews to offshore oil
rigs by helicopter, to operations of large corporate jets and pro-
fessionally managed fractional-ownership fleets. 2 6
B. GENERAL AVIATION AIRPORTS
GA aircraft, flown by the 550,000 active GA pilots and instruc-
tors,27 can take off and land at almost any airport, including
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 4-5.
20 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 6-9.
21 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 3. Personal flying is defined as
flying for pleasure or personal transportation and not for business purposes. GEN-
ERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6, at 6.
22 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 3.
23 Id.
24 Business flying is defined as the use of aircraft in connection with the pilot's
occupation or private business. Corporate flying, in contrast, is the use of aircraft
owned or leased by a corporation or business and flown by a professional pilot.
GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6, at 7-8.
25 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 3.
26 Id.
27 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6, at
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many of the nation's commercial service airports..2 ' But, about
14,000 private-use GA airports and 4,800 public-use GA airports
also crisscross the nation.2 9 Public-use GA airports vary in size
and complexity, from the small grass landing strips that serve
remote areas to the busy urban airports that can accommodate
large jets on an assortment of paved runways."' Additionally,
about 2,500 GA airports are part of the Federal Aviation Admin-
istration's ("FAA") National Plan of Integrated Airport Systems
("NPIAS"), which identifies airports that are significant to na-
tional air transportation and provides funding for infrastructure
and safety development.I Finally, 334 NPIAS GA airports are
designated as reliever airports, intended to help relieve conges-
tion at commercial airports by diverting GA traffic away from
commercial airports."2
The myriad of GA categories illustrates how the 19,000 GA
airports located across the country can differ in their proximity
to urban areas, amount of activity, and types of operations they
support. For example, Richard Lloyd Jones Airport (RVS), lo-
cated five miles south of Tulsa, Oklahoma, was the eighth busi-
est GA airport in the nation in 2004, averaging 926 operations
per day." The airport boasts a control tower manned sixteen
hours each day, three asphalt runways, and 543 based aircraft
(including twenty-one jets). 4 In contrast, Harry Stern Airport
(BWP) in Wahpeton, North Dakota has no control tower, one
asphalt runway, one turf strip that is closed during the winter
months, thirty-five based aircraft, and averages only twenty-seven
28 GENERAL AVIATION: STATUS, sufpra note 9, at 3.
29 GENERAl. AVIATION SECURI'IY: INCREASEI) FEDERAl OVrERSIGHT, supra note 6, at
10. Private-use GA airports are owned by private parties and may only be used by
the owner or with the owner's permission. GENERAL AvIATION: STA-IUS, supra note
9, at 17.
"I, GENERAl_ AVIATION SECURIry: INCREASEi) FFDERAl_ OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 11.
"I GENRmI AVIATION: STATUS, supra note 9, at 15-16. For a GA airport to be
part of the NPIAS, it must have at least ten based aircraft and fewer than 2,500
scheduled passenger boardings. 1I. at 17.
"2 Id. at 16.
33 AirNav.com, Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport, http://wwv.airnav.com/air-
port/KRVS (last visited Mar. 22, 2006); GAMA, GENERAL AvIArION STATISTIC,\L
DA [EBOOK 2004 33 (2005), available at http://www.gama.aero/dloads/2004Statis-
ticalDatabook.pdf.
3' AirNav.com, Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport, supra note 33; Tulsa Airport
Authority, http://www.tulsaairports.com/rljones/rljones-airport.html (last vis-
ited Mar. 22, 2006).
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operations per day. 5 Interestingly, 6% of its operations are
made up of another category of GA use: air taxi business (that is,
on-demand charter services).36
C. GENERAL AvIATION SECURITY BEFORE 9-11
GA has always been more free from regulation and oversight
than commercial aviation, a fact valued by GA pilots.3 7 Prior to
the 9-11 tragedies, the FAA was responsible for the security of
GA.3 8 The FAA often worked with various agencies and GA in-
dustry members to determine which safety recommendations to
implement and whether to execute the initiatives through laws
and regulations, formal guidance, or voluntary programs 9.3  The
FAA also determined the requirements for pilot certification but
did not require background checks of anyone seeking a pilot
license. 40 In fact, most of the pre-9-11 FAA safety programs in-
volved operational procedures such as takeoffs, landings, and
flight patterns and were often intended to address the industry's
biggest concern: the GA accident rate.4 For example, one
broad pre-9-11 initiative was "Safer Skies," developed with indus-
try organizations and the FAA to improve the safety record of
commercial aviation and GA.4 2 One of the specific goals of
"Safer Skies" was to reduce the GA accident rate by 20% before
2007.43
Shortly after 9-11, on November 19, 2001, Congress enacted
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which created the
TSA within the Department of Transportation ("DOT") and de-
fined its primary responsibility as securing all modes of transpor-
tation, including aviation.44 The Homeland Security Act, passed
on November 25, 2002, reorganized the TSA under the new
35 AirNav.com, Harry Stern Airport, http://www.airnav.com/airport/KBWP
(last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
36 Id.
37 GENERAL AVIATION: STATUS, supra note 9, at 8.
38 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6, at
13.
39 GENERAL AVIATION: STATUS, supra note 9, at 5.
40 Id.; GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note
6, at 25.
41 GENERAL AVIATION: STATUS, supra note 9, at 5. While the GA accident rate
has been continually improving over the years, in 1998 it was still about twenty-
four times higher than the accident rate of commercial aviation and accounted
for 99% of all accidents and 85% of all fatal accidents. Id.
42 Id. at 8.
43 Id.
44 AVIATION SECURITY: PROGRESS, supra note 1, at 1.
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DHS, which assumed overall responsibility for aviation secur-
ity.45 On the whole, the TSA has taken the lead in securing civil
aviation.46
GA has been described as a "major symbol of American inno-
vation, prosperity, and pioneering spirit,"47 yet it has been con-
sistently overshadowed by commercial aviation with its
overwhelming number of passengers. More recently, however,
GA has found itself subject to increasing scrutiny as intelligence
and congressional reports spotlight GA weaknesses and the po-
tential for terrorist exploit. The concern has moved from if GA
needs increased security regulation to how to create security
plans that adequately address an industry composed of such a
variety of aircraft, diversity of operations, and assortment of air-
ports. Next, this Comment will turn to the security initiatives
that have already taken up the challenge and find, for the most
part, that they are not comprehensive or enforceable.
II. CURRENT GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY MEASURES
First, emphasis must be placed on the fact that, for a variety of
reasons, GA currently faces very little regulation by any govern-
ment entity. Reports from the General Accountability Office4"
("GAO") indicate that when the TSA assumed responsibilities
from the FAA, many of these responsibilities did not apply to
GA.49 In addition, allegedly the federal government is wary of
regulating GA due to the competing needs of securing commer-
cial aviation, combined with the vastness and diversity of the GA
framework.50 Questions remain as to the extent of GA's risk of
terrorist threat,5' making the use of limited resources to secure
such a varied industry hard for the government to justify. Fur-
45 Id.
46 See GENERAL AvIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note
6, at 13. The FAA still has a security role, however, because of its sole authority to
impose temporary flight restrictions and to disburse grants to fund safety and
security enhancements at commercial and GA airports. Id. at 13-14.
47 Nathan J. Rice, Comment, The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994: A
Ten-Year Retrospective, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 945, 945 (2004).
48 The GAO is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress.
It gathers information and issues more than a thousand reports each year to help
Congress evaluate executive branch agencies. GAO, What is GAO?, http://wv.
gaol.gov/about/what.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
49 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6, at
14.
50 Id. at 1.
51 See infra Part III.
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thermore, the Congressional Research Service 5 2 ("CRS") reports
that policymakers are under tremendous pressure from GA in-
dustry members, who argue that inflexible statutory regulations
would put a huge burden on GA.5" Regardless of the exact rea-
sons for the federal government's hesitation, most of the re-
sponsibility for evaluating and improving GA security has
unfortunately fallen on individual GA airport operators and
managers. 54
Despite the lack of formal regulation, a variety of post-9-1 1
security initiatives, mostly voluntary in nature, have been put
into place by federal legislation, federal agencies, public and pri-
vate entity joint efforts, and nonfederal industry stakeholders.
Legislative actions since 9-11 primarily concern vetting
55 of
flight school applicants and pilots. 56 Post-9-1 1 regulatory actions
focus on airport and airspace restrictions, mostly around Wash-
ington, D.C. 57 The majority of the security plans implemented
since 9-11 are in the form of general guidelines or cooperative
arrangements between GA industry groups and the TSA.58
Lastly, aircraft owners and pilots, airport operators and manag-
ers, and state governments also employ their own security plans,
many financed through their own budgets. 59 Each of these cate-
gories of post-9-1 1 security programs will be addressed in turn,
including their purported weaknesses.
A. LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS
The TSA requires that all flight school employees undergo an-
nual security awareness training.60 The training teaches employ-
ees how to recognize suspicious activities of flight school
applicants or participants, the types of suspicious behavior that
52 The Congressional Research Service is the public policy research arm of
Congress. It is a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress that
provides Congress with analysis, research, and information services that are objec-
tive and nonpartisan. Congressional Research Service, About CRS, http://www.
loc.gov/crsinfo/whatcrs.html#about (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
53 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 8.
54 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6, at
1.
55 Vetting is generally defined as the careful or critical examination of some-
thing or someone, often done prior to employment. Allwords.com, Definition of
Vett, http://www.allwords.com/word-vetting.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).




o 49 C.F.R. § 1552.23 (2004).
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must be investigated further, and what steps to take if they sus-
pect terrorist intent."' In addition, all United States flight
schools must have an acting security manager to oversee the
school's completion of the mandated security programs."2 Fur-
thermore, the TSA compels anyone who applies for flight train-
ing at United States flight schools, regardless of the applicant's
citizenship or the type of aircraft involved, to supply them with
certain background information."3 The TSA also developed and
codified the Alien Flight Training Program,"4 governing exten-
sive background checks of foreign candidates for United States
flight training schools."
5
Despite these important new laws, a recent GAO report found
limitations in the process used to conduct compliance inspec-
tions of flight training programs, particularly because the TSA
has not developed any kind of schedule for conducting the in-
spections." Additionally, the report noted that the TSA has not
calculated the resources necessary to monitor compliance with
the new regulations regarding background checks for non-
United States citizen flight school applicants. 7
The FAA remains involved in the ongoing legislative process
to make pilot licenses more secure. Before 9-11, pilot licenses
were large paper certificates, often carried in the pilot's pockets,
and usually tattered and faded from continued folding and un-
folding. In July 2003, the FAA began issuing new credit card-
sized, security-enhanced pilot licenses to active and new pilots."8
But because these new licenses still do not contain a photograph
of the license-holder, current regulations require that pilots
carry a government-issued photo ID and present it, along with
their license, upon any request from law enforcement."' This
13 GA Security, GA Pilots Are Not a Threat, http://ww.gaservingamerica.
com/GA-Pilots-Security.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
62 Id.
49 C.F.R. § 1552.3 (2004).
49 U.S.C.A. § 44939 (West 2005).
65 Id. Non-U.S. citizens must provide the TSA with a complete set of finger-
prints, biographical information, and training specifics such as the type of air-
craft the candidate will learn to operate.
Id.; GA Security, GA Pilots Are Not a Threat, supra note 61.
11 GENERAi, AVIArION SECURITY: INCREASLD FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, sulrl note 6, at
4, 24, 27.
67 Id. at 24.
GA Security, GA Pilots Are Not a Threat, supra note 61.
SECURING GENERAL Av A ION, supra note 3, at 26.
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should soon change, however, because a new law70 requires the
FAA to develop and issue new pilot licenses that include a pho-
tograph of the pilot and have the ability to incorporate biomet-
ric information v.7  The FAA has not yet announced any specific
plans to issue these new pilot licenses.7 2
B. REGULATORY ACTIONS
1. Restrictions at Washington D.C. Airports
Immediately after 9-11, Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport (DCA) in Washington, D.C., was closed to all GA opera-
tions and remained that way long after the airport was re-
opened to commercial flights. 73 GA at DCA has always been an
important part of the aviation industry, both economically and
symbolically.74 For example, before 9-11 DCA averaged 660 GA
flights per week,75 generating about $50 million per year in di-
rect economic activity in the Washington, D.C., area. 76 Presi-
dent Bush noted the important symbolic nature of DCA when,
upon re-opening it to commercial flights, he stated, "This is the
airport that brings our Nation's leaders to Washington to do the
people's business ... By opening this airport, we're making yet
another statement to the terrorists-You can't win." 7 Still, DCA
remained closed to all GA operations until October 2005, when,
after years of intense pressure from the GA lobby, the TSA re-
opened DCA to select GA operators under a stringent security
plan. 78 This interim final rule (to be re-examined one year from
its implementation) applies to all forty-eight GA flights per day
70 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
458, § 4022, 118 Stat. 3638, 4022 (2004).
71 Id.; SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 26.
72 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 26; Editorial, Safer Skies? Not
This Way, USA TODAY, June 7, 2005, at A12.
73 Hearing, supra note 15, at 111-12 (statement of David M. Stone, Acting Ad-
ministrator, TSA).
74 Id. at 113.
75 Press Release, TSA, TSA Opens Ronald Reagan Washington Airport to Gen-
eral Aviation Operations (Oct. 18, 2005) [hereinafter Press Release].
76 Hearing, supra note 15, at 4 (testimony of Rep. Eleanor Norton, Member,
House Comm. on Transportation and Infrastructure).
77 Id. at 101 (statement of Elizabeth Haskins, President, Signature Flight Sup-
port) (quoting President George W. Bush, Remarks at Announcement of Re-
Opening of Reagan National Airport (Oct. 2, 2001), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gove/news/releases/2001 / 10/20011002-8.html).
78 Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport: Enhanced Security Proce-
dures for Certain Operations, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,586 (July 19, 2005) (to be codified
at 49 C.F.R. pts. 1520, 1540, 1562).
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into DCA.7 "M But to fly into DCA, the operator must fit the TSA's
definition of a "corporate operator," ' a difficult task for most
GA operators, who would have to be reimbursed any and all
costs by the TSA.8 ' Privately-owned planes, or even planes
owned by a corporation but operated by private persons, are not
eligible.82 Industry groups, while elated at the re-opening, con-
tinue to stress that the majority of GA pilots and operations can-
not fly into DCA with such arduous restrictions.8" Policymakers
generally seem to agree, and at least one alleged that the restric-
tions are preferential and that the TSA is "limiting access to Na-
tional to mostly the largest and most influential general aviation
operators and Fortune 500 companies." 4
GA was also unable to fly into the three GA airports85 located
closest to the Washington, D.C. area, known as the "DC-3" air-
ports, until February 2002, when they were partially re-opened
to based aircraft. 6 But even if a GA pilot does have an aircraft
based at one of the DC-3 airports, he or she must still undergo
extensive clearing and vetting procedures because the DC-3 air-
ports lie within the fifteen-mile flight restricted zone around
Washington, D.C.8 7 The pilot must have exemplary compliance
records, undergo inconvenient background checks,88 and re-
79 Press Release, supra note 75.
80 To be a GA corporate operator, the flight must include a paid flight crew, an
operations manual, recurrent flight training, an on-board security officer, secur-
ity screening at one of the twelve gateway airports, plus TSA approval at least
twenty-four hours in advance for every flight crew member and passenger on
board. SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 34.
81 Id.
82 Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association ("AOPA"), Air Traffic Services Brief,
GA Access/Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), http://www.
aopa.org/whatsnew/air-traffic/dca.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
83 See, e.g., AOPA, GA returns to DCA? Well, not really..., Oct. 18, 2005, http://
www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2005/05 1018dca.html.
84 Letter from Bennie G. Thompson, Ranking Member, H. Comm. on Home-
land Security, to the DOT (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.aopa.org/
whatsnew/newsitems/2005/050929dca-letter.pdf.
85 College Park (CGS), Washington Executive/Hyde Field (W32), and Poto-
mac Airpark (VKX).
86 AOPA, Air Traffic Services Brief, Washington, D.C, Flight Restricted Zone/
"DC-3" Airports, http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/air traffic/frz.html (last visited
Mar. 22, 2006).
87 Id.
88 Pilots must physically go to the Baltimore FAA Flight Standards District Of-
fice for a records check and then to DCA to be fingerprinted. Id.
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ceive special training on security procedures.89 Not surprisingly,
in March 2004, only 300 pilots had been cleared to fly into the
DC-3 airports.9"
The economic impact of these restrictions is felt particularly
hard at the DC-3 airports. College Park Airport is the most im-
portant of the DC-3 airports because of its proximity to the
Washington, D.C., subway system and its symbolic significance. 9'
Between 9-11 and March, 2004, the airport had a 92% drop in
operations and saw its gross revenues go down 54% from 2000.92
In addition to the direct costs of restricting access at the DC-3
airports, there are innumerable negative effects felt by the in-
dustries related to air transport, such as hotel, restaurant, and
field services.9" The federal government finally heeded the call
for relief and allocated resources to compensate the DC-3 air-
ports and associated businesses in its 2006 Transportation, Trea-
sury, Judiciary, and Housing Urban Development spending
bill.94
2. Airspace Restrictions
As briefly referenced above,95 the FAA has issued scores of
temporary flight restrictions9 6 ("TFRs") around the nation.
TFRs are the source of a contentious and ongoing debate, fu-
eled by their direct effect on freedom of movement and air com-
merce.9" Although a complete analysis of TFRs is beyond the
scope of this paper, a precursory look is warranted. Before 9-11,
TFRs were usually issued to protect airspace during events of
89 Letter from Andrew V. Cebula, Senior Vice President, AOPA, to the DOT
(Sep. 28, 2005), available at http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2005/
050929dca-comments.pdf.
90 Subcommittee on Aviation, Field Hearing on Opening Reagan National Air-
port to General Aviation (2004), http://house.gov/transportation/aviation/03-
16-04/03-16-04memo.html (under Related Issues DC-3 Airports).
91 It is the nation's oldest airport, built by the Wrights in 1909 to demonstrate
the airport to the U.S. Army. Hearing, supra note 15, at 55 (statement of Phil
Boyer, President, AOPA).
92 Id. at 54.
93 Id.
94 AOPA, Congress Provides $5 million Compensation for DC-3 Airports, Nov. 22,
2005 http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2005/051122dc3.html.
95 See supra text accompanying note 46.
96 TFRs are rules that restrict aircraft from operating within defined areas, on a
temporary or permanent basis, in order to protect persons or property in the air
or on the ground. GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT,
supra note 6, at 14.
97 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 36.
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limited duration.'8 Since then, however, TFRs are increasingly
being used for national security over important infrastructure
and are growing in size, amount, and duration, resulting in
many accidental violations.9 In fact, over 3,500 violations of the
Washington, D.C., area flight restrictions have occurred since
January 2003."" According to FAA officials, TFR violations typi-
cally result in a fifteen- to ninety-day suspension of the pilot's
license.' Apparently, the TFR breaches are most commonly
caused by pilots not reading the flight area's required "Notices
to Airmen," which warn of the establishment, condition, or
change of a TFR.1 1
The alarming amount of TFR violations has made some ques-
tion the effectiveness of TFRs' deterrent effect and, to the out-
rage of GA industry members, has resulted in the Capitol
Airspace Enforcement Act, a bill that would greatly increase the
fines for pilots who breach the Washington, D.C. TFRs.113 GA
industry groups also lament the economic loss and inconve-
nience resulting from the expansion of TFRs since 9-11. A study
by the National Business Aviation Association estimated that be-
tween 9-11 and March 2004, TFRs caused the cancellation of
11,000 GA flights, the postponement of 74,000 GA flights, and
the diverting of over 100,000 GA flights to more circuitous
routes, resulting in a $1 billion loss to GA passengers and
firms. 114 Others, however, have raised different concerns re-
garding TFRs, such as whether they could truly protect impor-
tant structures in the event of a terrorist attack unless coupled
with elaborate and expensive air defense capabilities. 10 5 Lastly,
the GAO has expressed its own trepidation about the lack of any
written processes and policies to re-examine the necessity of a
98 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6, at
29-30.
99 Id. at 36.
100 AOPA, AOPA Opposes Another Pilot Penalty Bill, July 27, 2005, http://
www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2005/050727bill.html.
10, GENERAL AVlATION SECURFIY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 36-37.
102 Id. at 30, 36-37.
103 Errant pilots can now be fined anywhere from $10,000 to $100,000 for vio-
lating the fifteen-mile radius flight restricted zone around Washington D.C. Cap-
itol Airspace Enforcement Act, H.R. 3465, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
104 GENERAL AxIATbON SECURIT': INCREASED FEDERAL OVIRSIGHT, Supra note 6,
at 37.
115 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 39.
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TFR 1 6 To be fair, the FAA claims that it occasionally reviews
the continuing need for the existing flight restrictions that are
in place for indefinite periods of time, such as those established
for the Department of Defense and those surrounding the na-
tional capital region."0 7 However, creating written TFR review-
ing procedures would help the FAA to work more openly with
GA industry members in striking a balance between national se-
curity and air commerce concerns.
C. JOINT EFFORTS BY PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTITIES
Since 9-11, the TSA has focused its efforts on strengthening
commercial aviation security and satisfying associated congres-
sional mandates, unfortunately resulting in fewer resources
available to improve GA security.108 Still, with assistance from
private industry groups, the TSA has developed and published
different forms of security guidance. Important to remember,
however, is that TSA does not currently regulate GA airport se-
curity, the airport operator implements these guidelines at its
sole discretion109
First, the General Aviation Airport Security Working Group' 0
("Working Group") and the Aviation Security Advisory Commit-
tee11 ("ASAC") met together throughout the summer of 2003,
reviewing possible GA airport security recommendations and
evaluating each recommendation for effectiveness and appro-
priateness.1 12 The resulting report delivered to the TSA out-
lined their suggested security guidelines, which the TSA
published in late 2003.113
106 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 39.
107 Id. at 24.
108 Id.
109 Id. at 17.
110 The Working Group has members from GA industry groups like AOPA,
GAMA, and the Experimental Aircraft Association, to name a few. Id. at 42 n. 50.
111 The ASAC is made up of a wide range of interested parties, including law
enforcement and security experts, government agencies, airport operators, and
victims of terrorist acts against aviation. General Aviation Security: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement
of Andrew V. Cebula, Senior Vice President, AOPA) [hereinafter Hearing S.
Comm.].
112 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 45.
113 TSA, REPORT OF THE AVIATION SECURITY ADVISORY COMMITTEE WORKING




Several months later the TSA published "Security Guidelines
for General Aviation Airports"'"1 4 ("Security Guidelines"), again
with the help of industry associations. The Security Guidelines
include an airport characteristic tool to help GA airport opera-
tors assess their airport's security weaknesses and implement the
most appropriate security improvements. 1 5 It also identifies
several factors that could make an airport more or less vulnera-
ble to terrorist exploit." 6 By all accounts, industry groups, indi-
vidual GA airports, and even state governments have been using
the Security Guidelines to assess risk, develop security plans, and
implement other programs.
Perhaps the two most touted joint-effort security programs are
the Airport Watch Program and the TSA Access Certificate Pro-
gram. The AOPA, in conjunction with the TSA, launched the
Airport Watch Program in December 2002 with the goal of im-
proving GA airport community awareness.1 17 Supported by a
TSA-sponsored toll free hotline, the program provides warning
signs, informational literature, and training videotapes to GA
airports." 8 The hotline began receiving calls in May 2004 re-
garding a variety of airports' concerns of suspicious activities." 9
Most recently, the 2006 DHS Act provides $275,000 to support
the watch program. 120 The TSA Access Certificate Program al-
lows TSA-approved airport operators to operate internationally
without the need of a waiver each time they enter the country.'12
To get the TSA's approval to participate in the certificate pro-
gram, the airports must implement a set of security protocols
developed by the National Business Aviation Association. 122
Currently this program is still being tested and is therefore ap-
114 TSA, PUB. A-001, SECUPRTY GUIDELINES FOR GENERAL AVIATION AIRPORTS 1
(2004) available at http://www.tsa.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/security-guidelines
for-general-aviation airports-may2004a-001.pdf [hereinafter SECURITy
GUIDELINES].
115 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 17.
116 SECURITY GUIDELINES, supra note 114, at 5-6. These factors include airport
location, number of based aircraft, length of runways, and the number and type
of operations. Id.
117 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 22.
118 Id.
119 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 5, 43.
120 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 22.
121 Id. at 33.
122 Id.
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plied only at three airports in the Northeast. 123 But the TSA is
evaluating its possible use as a national security standard for cor-
porate and business operators. 124 In recent months, the House
Committee on Appropriations encouraged the TSA to continue
and expand the certificate program during 2006.125
D. ACTION BY NON-FEDERAL GENERAL AVIATION STAKEHOLDERS
Perhaps the most extensive efforts toward securing GA have
been made by the varying industry groups, individual state gov-
ernments, and the GA airports themselves. Almost every GA in-
dustry association has developed best practices and security
recommendations for its members. For example, even the Na-
tional Agricultural Aircraft Association created a program to ed-
ucate its members126 on security issues. 127
Many United States states have joined the effort to secure GA
and have come up with a myriad of initiatives. Some states, such
as New Jersey, implemented new requirements for security that
now require all aircraft stored at GA airports to be secured with
at least two locks. 12 Other states provide direct funding for en-
hanced security at GA airports. For example, Tennessee distrib-
uted more than $1 million in federal grants to help fund its GA
airports' installation of better security lighting, fencing, and
gates. 129 California is now providing the entire local match to a
GA airport that receives an Airport Improvement Program
("AP") grant"' for security projects.' 3 ' Lastly, some states, like
Virginia, distribute security audit checklists and manuals to their
GA airports to help them assess vulnerabilities and adapt secur-
ity plans to their facilities.'3 2
Many individual GA airports across the country, often at their
own initiative and cost, employ additional security measures and
procedures. Examples include the addition of perimeter fenc-
123 Id.
124 Id. at 34.
125 Id.
126 Most members are aerial application pilots who use aircraft to enhance
food and fiber production, protect forestry, and control pests. GENERAL AVIATION
SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6, at 45.
127 Id.
128 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 31.
129 Hearing S. Comm., supra note 111.
130 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 39-40.




ing, lighting, monitoring systems with live feed to local law en-
forcement, warning signs, and additional security guards.1""
While GA security regulation is mostly voluntary in nature and
often plagued by loopholes, one could still conclude that GA is
as secure as it needs to be. However, the next Part will address
the magnitude of the potential threat confronting GA, first by
examining and rejecting arguments that GA is not at risk and
then explaining why GA is at risk.
III. ASSESSING THE THREAT TO THE SECURITY
OF GENERAL AVIATION
Concerns linger about the potential for terrorist exploit of
GA. Every policymaker and industry group seems to have a dif-
ferent opinion about exactly how risky GA truly is. This is due to
the extreme diversity of GA aircraft, airports, and operations, as
well as the conflicting interests espoused by involved parties.
The GA industry members, concerned about revenues and pub-
lic image, are quick to champion the security initiatives in place
while insisting that GA is not attractive to terrorists.1"4 This can
be a tough sell when the media continues to splash across the
front page any small plane theft, 1 1 5 high-profile airspace restric-
tion violation,'36 or congressional report alleging the vulnerabil-
ities of GA. For example, a GAO report explicitly stated that
since 9-11, the TSA has taken little action to enhance GA secur-
ity, leaving GA far more exposed and vulnerable than commer-
cial aviation. 3  This Part will attempt to define and analyze the
GA threat because "[b]efore security standards can be devel-




'" GINFRAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 42.
134 See, e.g., AOPA, General Aviation and Homeland Security: A Security Brief b the
Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Jan. 23, 2004, http://www.aopa.org/whats
new/newsitems/2002/02062 1 homelandsecurity.html.
'': 7Online.com, Man Accused of a Drunken Joyride in Stolen Plane, June 22, 2005,
http://abclocal.go.com/wabc/story?section=investigators&id=3184859.
'36 NBC4.com, supra note 2.
137 AvIATION SECURITY: EFFORTS, supra note 8, at 24.
1-"8 SECURIN.; GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 18-19 (quoting Donald Sprus-
ton, Security Requirement for GA Operations Should be Based on Threat Assessment, 8
INT'L Civ. AVIATION ORG. J. 18 (2002)).
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A. WHY GENERAL AVIATION Is NOT AT RISK
FOR TERRORIST EXPLOIT
A substantial body of commentary claims GA is not at risk for
use by terrorists for a variety of reasons. First, GA aircraft have
never been used in a known terrorist attack anywhere in the
world.'39 Agencies sometimes seem to concur, such as when for-
mer TSA administrator Admiral James Loy told the House Avia-
tion Sub-Committee in October 2003 that the highly emotional
period right after the 9-11 attacks led to security officials over-
stating the threat posed by GA.140 Then, another former TSA
administrator stated in March 2004 that the agency was "not
aware of any specific information regarding terrorist plans to
use general aviation or charter aircraft to strike targets in the
Washington metropolitan region. "141 Furthermore, and as
noted above, the majority of GA aircraft flown are small, single-
engine planes. The most popular GA aircraft, the Cessna 172,142
weighs only about 2,400 pounds, less than a Honda Civic, and
can carry only about fifty-six gallons of fuel. 141 In contrast, a
typical Boeing 767 weighs 400,000 pounds and carries 25,000
gallons of fuel. 144 Many believe that the low weight, fuel, and
load-carrying capacity of most GA aircraft would not allow them
to inflict significant damage. 4 5 For these reasons, industry and
TSA officials have clearly opined that the small size and lack of
destructive power of most GA aircraft make them unappealing
to terrorists. 146 Even obtaining a GA aircraft seems relatively dif-
ficult, as data shows that historically only about a dozen GA air-
craft are stolen per year.147 The International Civil Aviation
Organization pointed out that for GA to be a threat, an aircraft
must be fueled up and ready to fly, the target must be reasona-
bly close, the reasons for using the aircraft must be specific, and
139 AOPA, General Aviation and Homeland Security, supra note 134.
140 AOPA, TSA Tells Congress GA Threat Was Overstated in Wake of Attacks, Oct. 17,
2003, http://www.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitems/2003/03-4-059x.html.
14, Hearing, supra note 15, at 112 (statement of David M. Stone, Acting Admin-
istrator, TSA).
142 In the United States alone there are over 25,000 registered Cessna 172s.
Hearing S. Comm., supra note 111.
143 Id.; AOPA, General Aviation and Homeland Security, supra note 134.
144 AOPA, General Aviation and Homeland Security, supra note 134.
145 GA Security, GA Aircraft Are Not a Threat-Small and Slow, http://
www.gaservingamerica.com/GA-Aircraft-Security.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
146 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 15-16.
147 AOPA, General Aviation and Homeland Security, supra note 134.
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the person must be able to operate it under the circum-
stances.' 48 Therefore many variables must be in place before
GA could ever be used as a weapon. In addition, a large num-
ber of GA aircraft are located at rural GA airports, miles from
any large city or potential target.'49 Lastly, the inherent nature
of most GA operations is less risky.1 50 Unlike the scheduled
commercial aviation flights, business aviation passengers are on
board only by the invitation of others, who know the passengers
and why they are on board. 15 And, the typical GA airport is
often characterized as a "small neighborhood," where people at
the airport know each other, and suspicious activity is quickly
noticed. 52
B. WHY GENERAL AVIATION Is AT RISK
FOR TERRORIST EXPLOIT
Counterarguments abound to the points raised above. First,
as referenced previously, the GA fleet includes a growing popu-
lation of turbojets. Therefore, the arguments by industry offi-
cials that GA aircraft can do little harm apply only to the smaller
aircraft that, admittedly, make up most of the GA fleet. But, in
assessing GA vulnerabilities, one cannot overlook that larger
planes are kept in the unregulated and often loosely secured GA
airports across our nation. These larger jets have significantly
larger payload and fuel capacities that directly affect the degree
of physical damage they could cause to intended targets.5 3 As
the Congressional Research Service noted in one of its reports,
"Due to the size and speed of some of these aircraft, particularly
mid-sized and large business jets, they could inflict significant
damage on buildings and critical infrastructure if used in a sui-
cide attack."'154
But the industry's position that most GA aircraft could never
carry enough explosives to do any real damage assumes that ter-
148 Int'l Council of Aircraft Owner & Pilot Ass'ns, General Aviation Security, Apr.
23, 2004, http://www.iaopa.org/info/assembly22/april23.html.
149 For example, Harry Stern Airport, the facility mentioned in Part I, above, is
located fifty-seven miles south of the nearest big city, Fargo, North Dakota. The
closest symbolic target would probably be Mount Rushmore, over 500 miles away,
in the Black Hills of South Dakota.
150 Hearing, supra note 15, at 15 (testimony of Shelley A. Longmuir, President
and Chief Executive Officer, National Business Aviation Association).
151 Id.
152 AOPA, General Aviation and Homeland Security, supra note 134.
153 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 16.
154 Id.
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rorists will use conventional explosives. Smaller aircraft can
pose a considerable threat if used as a platform for chemical or
biological attacks.'55 Indeed, the slow speed and low altitude of
most GA aircraft flights may actually be an advantage for this
kind of attack, as compared to larger, faster aircraft. 156 Also,
while operators of business jets may often know all of the on-
board passengers, operators of charter jets and services, an inte-
gral part of the GA sector, will rarely know their on-board
passengers.
Despite the arguments raised above that GA is not at risk for
terrorist exploit, there is still a loud voice in the aviation indus-
try that continues to warn of the vulnerabilities of GA. This
ever-increasing group believes that the main threat comes from
terrorists using GA aircraft to attack vital areas or infrastruc-
ture. 1 57 There is also the concern that terrorists could exploit
GA to learn information about or to access the U.S. airspace
system. 158 Most of the data in this area stress two particular GA
industry weaknesses: accessing and flying GA aircraft, and the
vulnerabilities caused by the emphasis placed on securing com-
mercial aviation. Each limitation will be addressed in the follow-
ing two subsections.
1. Accessing and Flying General Aviation Aircraft
There is no doubt that the majority of GA aircraft are readily
available, are relatively inexpensive, and require less skill and
training to pilot than larger aircraft. 59 In fact, the former Act-
ing Administrator of the TSA alluded to GA vulnerabilities in
testimony that referenced the ease with which GA aircraft can
be bought, accessed, and piloted. 6 ° These unfortunate facts
have also been illustrated in a string of thefts and crashes of
small aircraft 6' that expose both the industry's and the govern-
155 Id. at 14.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 8.
158 Id.
159 Hearing, supra note 15, at 113 (statement of David M. Stone, Acting Admin-
istrator, TSA).
160 Id. at 24 (testimony of David M. Stone, Acting Administrator, TSA).
161 In January 2002, a Florida teenage flight student crashed a Cessna airplane
into a Tampa skyscraper. AVIATION SECURITY: PROGRESS, supra note 1, at 14.
Then, in May 2005, a small plane violated restricted airspace over Washington,
D.C. and flew within three miles of the White House. NBC4.com, supra note 2.
Concerns spread again in October 2005 when a private jet was stolen from a
Florida airport. SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 11.
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ment's inability to secure GA aircraft. While the actual number
of GA aircraft stolen each year is low, another tragedy only takes
one plane, one opportunity, and one security slip-up.
Known terrorist groups seem to understand the ease with
which one can attain a small aircraft. Historical intelligence in-
dicates that terrorists have expressed interest in using GA air-
craft to conduct attacks. For example, the Central Intelligence
Agency ("CIA") reported that the 9-11 hijackers considered us-
ing crop dusters, a type of GA aircraft, to spread biological or
chemical agents such anthrax. 6 ' Additionally, the CIA found
that one of the 9-11 masterminds originally wanted to use small
aircraft filled with explosives to accomplish their plan. 6 ' More-
over, in May 2003, the DHS issued a security advisory that al-
Qaeda had been planning to crash a small GA-type aircraft
loaded with explosives into the United States Consulate in Paki-
stan.'1 4 Finally, an FBI/DHS report dated February 25, 2005' 65
stated that al-Qaeda has considered using helicopters instead of
recruiting operatives for fixed-wing aircraft operations because
of the helicopters' agility and ability to fly at low altitudes with-
out attracting much attention.'""
Moreover, some of the 9-11 hijackers learned to fly at local
flight schools around the nation. This fact puts a great deal of
added pressure on GA airports because they are the main source
for instructional flying.'1 7 For example, Richard Lloyd Jones
Airport, referenced above in Part I, includes six flight schools
alone. "'6
162 GENERAl. AVIATION SE(CURIVY: IN(RLASED FEDERAL OVERSIGItT, Supra note 6,
at 16.
165 The confidential report was distributed to counterterrorism and aviation
officials and first reported in the New York Times. Lichtblau, supra note 7.
166 /d.
167 Nearly 70% of the nation's commercial aviation pilots start their career and
training in GA. Hearing, supra note 15, at 46 (statement of Edward M. Bolen,
President, GAMA).
168 AirNav.com, Richard Lloyd Jones Jr. Airport, http://w.airnav.com/air-
port/KRVS (last visited Mar. 22, 2006); Tulsa Airport Authority, http://vww.tulsa
airports.com/rljones/rljones-airport.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2006).
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2. The Effects of Stringent Commercial Aviation Security
Terrorists have demonstrated their ability to adopt new and
creative methods of attack.169 Indeed, the 9-11 Commission spe-
cifically found that one of the contributing factors to the 9-11
attacks was the failure of imagination among industry offi-
cials.17 ° These allegations could explain why the Secretary of
Homeland Security acknowledged that the Department, along
with the CIA, FBI, and other agencies, have no knowledge about
the time, place, and methods of possible terrorist attacks related
to GA.17 ' Just this past year, the FBI and other security experts
warned that as commercial aviation security improves, terrorists
may find smaller planes a more appealing mode of attack. 17 2
The February 2005 FBI/DHS report also raised this concern,
stating that "[a] s security measures improve at large commercial
airports, terrorists may choose to rent or steal general aviation
aircraft housed at small airports with little or no security."' 73
While terrorists could switch to a new method of attack not in-
volving airplanes, there is evidence that known terrorist groups
seem to have a "fixation" on using aircraft to attack United
States interests.'74 Federal agencies have noted that "[t]he pub-
lic fear resulting from a[n] . . . aircraft bombing also serves as a
powerful motivator for groups seeking to further their
causes."' 17 5 The fear is that as commercial aircraft become less
accessible, terrorists will revise their attack schemes to utilize the
more accessible GA aircraft.
No one can know if, when, and how terrorists will strike again.
But, the information available suggests that GA aircraft, loosely
housed at GA airports, should be strongly considered as poten-
tial weapons. As commercial aviation security increases each
year and no formal steps are taken to protect GA, the accessibil-
ity gap only widens between the two, resulting in GA becoming a
better option to those who wish to harm the country. As de-
tailed in the next Part, the proposed GA security bills currently
169 Hearing, supra note 15, at 113 (statement of David M. Stone, Acting Admin-
istrator, TSA).
170 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES,
108TH CONG., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 344 (2004).
171 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 15.
172 Safer Skies? Not This Way, supra note 72.
173 Lichtblau, supra note 7.
174 SECURING GENERAL AvIATION, supra note 3, at 12.
175 Lichtblau, supra note 7.
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before Congress will unfortunately do little to create a feasible
or effective security framework.
IV. THE FUTURE OF GENERAL AVIATION
SECURITY REGULATION
A plethora of options are available to increase GA security.
But, many alternatives are not economically sound, realistic, or
even necessary, especially at smaller GA airports located far
from major urban areas. 176 Other security options, such as in-
creasing airspace restrictions, will most likely inflame the GA in-
dustry groups due to their negative impact on air commerce.
Therefore, every security plan must be analyzed in a risk man-
agement framework that assesses the threat and vulnerability of
all of the different segments of the GA industry. This frame-
work must also consider the costs of any regulation, including
both the direct costs of implementation and oversight and the
indirect costs associated with the interference with air com-
merce and freedom of movement. This kind of system should
result in an effective and balanced security structure that can
generally appease all affected parties. Lastly, when evaluating
and comparing security initiatives, one must note that even the
best laid plans cannot stop all terrorist attacks. But, security ini-
tiatives can be put in place to deter would-be terrorists. This
Part analyzes different security initiatives either in progress or
proposed and suggests more comprehensive alternatives.
A. THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN
At the individual airport level, the TSA is developing a Trans-
portation Risk Assessment and Vulnerability Evaluation Tool to
address the needs of high-risk GA airports. 177 This tool, it is
thought, will help indicate which GA airports are nationally criti-
cal, allowing the TSA to conduct on-site inspections at those fa-
cilities. 7 8 While the TSA has never examined the systematic
threat potential of GA as a whole,"'7 the TSA is working on a
176 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 17.
177 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OvERSIGIT, supra note 6,
at 18.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 3-4. This will soon be changing, though, as conference report lan-
guage in the 2006 DHS Appropriations Act requires the DHS, in coordination
with the DOT, to study the "vulnerability posed to high-risk areas and facilities
from general aviation aircraft that could be stolen or used as a weapon against
those areas." H.R. Rep. No. 109-241, at 34 (2005) (Conf. Rep.). The analyses
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Vulnerability Identification Self-Assessment Tool ("VISAT") to
assist GA airport operators in creating a comprehensive security
baseline for their facilities.' The TSA intends to use this base-
line data submitted by the airports to conduct a systematic analy-
sis of vulnerabilities at GA airports nationwide. 8' Finally, the
TSA will establish minimum security standards, check the ade-
quacy of security regulations already in place, and in general
help everyone better utilize limited resources." 2
While this strategy appeals to common-sense logic and seems
cost-effective, the plan has an inherent weakness. The useful-
ness of the compiled data only directly relates to the quantity
and quality of data that the GA airports actually submit. This
could be a significant problem because GA airports are not re-
quired to use any of the TSA-created tools.8 3 Additionally, the
GAO has criticized the TSA's plan for not including any specific
milestones for executing these tools.' 8 4 Without these targets,
the TSA cannot keep track of the plan's progress, hold anyone
accountable for non-compliance, or start looking for other ways
to gather the necessary data to rid the security baseline of vul-
nerabilities."8 5 Also, estimates of the resources needed to suc-
cessfully implement the agency's approach do not exist,
resulting in an inability to allocate resources to the areas of
greatest need.' s While the TSA is resolving issues related to its
in-progress plan, a few proposed bills have surfaced that purport
to further GA security.
B. GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY ACT OF 2005
The proposed General Aviation Security Act of 2005,187 intro-
duced in July 2005 by Representative Sweeney, does not provide
an appropriate security framework and imposes prohibitive costs
on all GA airports without regard to their particular risk poten-
tial. This bill requires all GA airports, including private-use air-
should identify vulnerabilities at GA airports, the adequacy of existing security
measures, and any necessary additional security measures. Id.
180 Hearing S. Comm., supra note 111 (statement of Andrew V. Cebula, Senior
Vice President, AOPA).
181 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 17-18.
182 Id. at 18.
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id. at 4, 18.
186 Id.
187 General Aviation Security Act of 2005, H.R. 3397, 109th Cong. (2005).
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ports, to be fenced, all aircraft to be double-locked with an
internal and external lock, and all hangars to be locked when
not in use."' Furthermore, all GA airports will have to register
with the DHS and submit to local law-enforcement agencies and
the DHS a written security plan to be updated every three
years.'"" Additionally, at public-use GA airports, a written log of
every transient aircraft for the past five years must be main-
tained, access to aircraft keys must be restricted, and those rent-
ing aircraft must present a government-issued ID in addition to
a pilot license. 90 Airports must also post airport security warn-
ing signs and advisories, create an emergency locator map and
provide copies to emergency response agencies and local law en-
forcement, and familiarize local law enforcement with the air-
port and consult with them in the airport's development of
security procedures.19' Lastly, GA pilots will be required to ver-
ify the identity of all passengers on board."'92 The bill has been
referred to the Homeland Security Committee, and no hearings
have been held.
This proposed bill is the exact sort of "one size fits all ap-
proach . . . [that] is not only unworkable but unwise.""' : The
bill is not even remotely risk-based and makes no effort to assess
actual threats and vulnerabilities to GA and address them.
Rather, the bill "would be ridiculously expensive, is unnecessary,
and ignores the guiding principle of making investments in se-
curity based on risk."' 4
Specifically, the most expensive and unnecessary part of the
bill is the mandatory fencing of all GA airports. The TSA has
cautioned that physical barriers like fencing will not prevent de-
termined trespassers from gaining access.' 5 In fact, the TSA
noted that excessive spending on fencing could be detrimental
I-s ld. § 2 (d) (1) (A) -(C).
189, /d. § 2(b)-(c).
Id. § 2(d) (2) (B), (D), (E).
Id. § 2(d) (2) (F)-(H).
192 Id. § 2(d) (2) (A).
I',. Hearing, supra note 15, at 15 (testimony of Shelley A. Longmuir, President
and Chief Executive Officer, National Business Aviation Association).
11' AOPA, Congressional Bill Threatens GA With Expensive Security Mandates, Jul.
22, 2005, http://wwv.aopa.org/whatsnew/newsitemns/2005/O50722doublelocks.
html.
195 SECURING GENERAL AVIAIION, supra note 3, at 30 (quoting SECURITY GUIDE-
INES, supra note 114, at 12).
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overall by taking needed resources and opportunities away from
improving other security aspects. 19 6
Additionally, the requirement of keeping a log of all transient
aircraft over the past five years is practically unworkable at a tre-
mendous number of small, rural GA airports. Many of these fa-
cilities, such as Harry Stern Airport, described in Part I above,
are unattended, with few transient operations per day. To re-
quire these airports to keep a log of transient activities would
almost certainly require a constant attendant at enormous cost.
Furthermore, many airports such as Harry Stern Airport are lo-
cated in rural areas, far from urban cities where dense popula-
tions, critical infrastructure, and symbolic buildings attract
potential terrorists. Therefore, the concern about transient air-
craft is misplaced and unnecessary at a large number of GA
airports.
C. STRENGTHEN AVIATION SECURITY ACT
Another bill was recently proposed that affects GA security.
The Strengthen Aviation Security Act,197 introduced by Repre-
sentative Markey in May 2005, would require airport operators
to develop specific vulnerability assessments for every GA airport
and develop a plan for addressing the identified weaknesses
within one year. 9 ' Also, background checks and terrorist
database screening would be required for anyone with access to
GA aircraft.199 The intent seems to be for the screening to apply
to airport workers and pilots. 2° ° Additionally, the bill mandates
all GA aircraft to be secured by visible immobilizing devices,
such as prop locks.20 1
Similar to the General Aviation Security Act, this bill does not
address the diversity of GA airports and aircraft in prescribing
these broad-based and inconvenient security measures. In par-
ticular, the requirements for vetting and background checks on
any GA airport worker or pilot are costly and an unnecessary
intrusion into people's privacy.20 2 Plus, at small, rural GA air-
ports where pilots, ramp workers, and others that frequent the
196 Id.
197 Strengthen Aviation Security Act, H.R. 2649, 109th Cong. (2005).
198 Id. § 10(b)(1)-(2).
199 Id. § 10(c)(2).
200 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 41.
20, H.R. 2649 § 10(c)(1).
202 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 28.
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airport are all known to each other, the requirement becomes
cost-prohibitive and excessive.20 3
D. OTHER OPTIONS?
GA needs cost-effective security programs that deal with the
particular degree and type of risk at specific GA airports. In ad-
dition, any security requirements put into place must have the
cooperation and concurrence of GA industry groups in order to
effectively implement and communicate the program to the
thousands of GA airport owners, pilots, and other affected par-
ties. None of the proposed bills or future programs described
have managed to incorporate the diversity of the GA industry,
while keeping the focus on cost-effectiveness and risk-based as-
sessments. Therefore, this subpart will first explain a better gen-
eral approach for GA security programs and then describe
potential new security measures.
1. A Better Approach to General Aviation Security Programs
Overall, security mandates must be designed either for spe-
cific GA airports or specific categories of GA airports. The criti-
cal first step in designing these security plans is to identify risks
for different GA airports. The most cost-effective solution is to
use the TSA's VISAT, referenced above, that is still under pro-
duction. The GA VISAT is "designed to be a self-guided, com-
puter-based assessment tool designed to assess risk and
mitigation at GA airports. '"204 While it has been criticized by
some for its lack of differentiation between GA and the air car-
rier environment,"' a comprehensive, standardized tool like the
VISAT is necessary to start the process. But to effectively gather
security data from the individual GA airports, there must be a
preliminary mandate requiring all GA airports to utilize the
VISAT and submit their assessments. If some feel uneasy about
this preliminary requirement, options exist to tie in state or fed-
eral funding with the submission of VISAT data. Somehow, GA
airports must understand that completing and sending their
VISAT results is imperative.
Because developing plans for categories of GA airports will
probably be more cost-efficient than developing a plan for every
203 Id. at 28-29.
204 Id. at 20.
215 Robert Olislagers, General Aviation Security: The Ups & Downs of Threat Man-
agement, AIRPORT MAGAZINE, May/June 2005, at 60, available at http://www.print2
webcorp.com/news/airport/airportmagazine/20050921/p60.asp.
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individual GA airport, a system must be formulated to categorize
GA airports based on their risk level. A similar program has
been implemented for commercial airports, but the characteris-
tics of GA airports are so much more diverse than those of com-
mercial airports that a successful categorization system must
consider a wide array of possible risk factors, many of which are
site-specific. 20 6
Once these categories of GA airports have been identified,
different security programs can be designed with varying secur-
ity requirements. Various combinations of security measures
can include assorted methods of surveying and monitoring GA
airports, ensuring access controls, and implementing physical
security measures to protect GA aircraft.20 7 For example, GA air-
ports placed into a high-risk category may be required to have
all their employees with access to aircraft operations areas wear
identification badges, install keypad locks to control access to
aircraft, hire full time security monitoring, or use hangars to
store aircraft.20 8 For those GA airports that have been desig-
nated as low-risk, less expensive and less stringent requirements
can be instituted, such as ensuring the use of cabin or ignition
locks or immobilizing devices to secure the aircraft. Locking air-
craft may seem like a common-sense measure that is probably
already being done, but the October 2005 theft of a business jet
indicates otherwise: the jet, which does not need a key to start,
was left unlocked.20 9 The CRS agrees, stating that "[p]ropeller
locks and throttle locks may provide relative low cost, relatively
effective deterrents to unauthorized use and theft of aircraft. 210
Also, less risky GA airports can be required to install remotely
monitored security systems instead of full time on-site
security. 211
Any monitoring, access controls, or physical security measures
must be implemented with a diverse set of legitimate airfield
uses in mind.212 For example, many GA airports have a large
percentage of their operations made up of transient air traffic.
Therefore, any access control measures put into place must still
206 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 19.
207 Id. at 20.
208 Using a hangar is one of the most effective ways to secure aircraft. SECURITY
GUIDELINES, supra note 114, at 11.
209 SECURING GENERAL AvIATION, supra note 3, at 31.
210 Id.
211 Id. at 21.
212 Id. at 25.
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adequately accommodate transient users. Possibilities include
giving transient users the code to keypad locks, while changing
the code often enough to prevent unauthorized access.211
Even after the designing and implementing of all these cate-
gories and programs, the concern remains that GA airport oper-
ators could have difficulty in independently financing any newly
required security enhancements. 2 14 For example, while the TSA
and industry officials agree that hangars are the safest way to
protect GA aircraft, they are also the most expensive access-con-
trol measure. Federal funding might also be a challenge be-
cause GA airports' needs must compete with the needs of
commercial airports for security funding.2 15 Currently, about
3,000 GA airports are eligible to receive FAA AIP grants, which
can be used for security purposes if federal regulation requires
the improvements or equipment, or, according to the FAA, if
the TSA determines an airport-specific need for security en-
hancements. 2 " This program is inherently limited, though, be-
cause the airport must be part of the NPIAS to be eligible for
the AlP grants. 17 Additionally, according to the GAO, GA air-
ports received $561 million in AIP grants in 2002, of which only
about 0.6% was awarded for security projects. 2II
There is still hope, however, as language in the Century of
Aviation Reauthorization Act provides greater flexibility in allo-
cating federal AIP grants for hangar construction at GA air-
ports.2 " The Act also assures long term lease agreements
between airport operators and aircraft owners who build han-
gars with their own resources.2 1 Other options are also worth
exploring to find more federal funding for GA airports. For ex-
ample, the GAO suggests looking to the State Homeland Secur-
ity Grant Program, the Urban Areas Security Initiative, and the
Aviation Security Capital Fund.21
213 Id.




217 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
218 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAI OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 39-40.
2' Vision 100 - Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176,
§ 149, 117 Stat. 2490, 2505 (2000).
220 Id. at § 165.
221 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDEIERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 40.
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2. Possible Additions to General Aviation Security Plans
Two specific security measures not addressed in any legisla-
tion are Behavior Pattern Recognition ("BPR") techniques and
threat information dissemination. BPR techniques could pro-
vide an economical and effective boost to GA airport security
and programs already in place. Enhancing the threat communi-
cation process is imperative to any industry, but particularly for
GA, where the best defense can be at the ground level using the
eyes and ears of GA airport operators.
First, BPR techniques, used at many airports around the
world, help individuals notice and examine deviations from nor-
mal behavioral patterns.222 Those trained in the techniques ana-
lyze passengers for suspicious behaviors, such as "wearing heavy
clothing on a hot day or loitering in a terminal with no lug-
gage. '22' Basically, the BPR training gives individuals objective
ways of analyzing behavior and discerning what is suspicious. 224
Rafi Ron, the former security director at Ben-Gurion Airport in
Israel, developed the BPR plan used at Logan International Air-
port in Boston, Massachusetts, and has described the technique
as "a methodology for identifying suspicious people that you
want to pay more attention to."225 One of the main advantages
of using BPR techniques when dealing with terrorism is how the
training can "push the detection ring to the outer perimeter of a
protected target. "226 For example, when Mr. Ron trained Statue
of Liberty employees in BPR techniques, he provided two levels
of preparation. 227 He organized an awareness program that
trained all employees in observational skills but also provided
law enforcement-level training (involving more complex tech-
niques) for the police officers assigned to the facility. 228 The
BPR techniques are not without their critics, however. The Mas-
sachusetts chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union
("ACLU") has filed a lawsuit against BPR techniques in use at
222 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 24.
223 The Jewish Inst. for Nat'l Sec. Affairs, Desperate Days for Aviation Security,
Sept. 16, 2005, http://www.jinsa.org/articles/articles.html/function/view/cate-
goryid/ 1333/documentid/3152/history/3,2360,656,1333,3152.
224 Gov't Sec.: Tech. Solutions in Def. of the Homeland, Standing Watch for








Logan International Airport, claiming that they encourage eth-
nic and racial profiling.2 29 But some have suggested that imple-
menting BPR techniques would actually result in less racial
profiling because it would increase the number of trained ob-
servers reporting truly suspicious behavior rather than uninten-
tionally relying on racial or ethnic stereotyping.2 ""°
Despite the alleged constitutional problems, the TSA recently
created its own BPR program known as "Screening Passengers
by Observational Techniques," or SPOT.2 "' The TSA intro-
duced the program in Boston in 2002 and expanded it to Maine
in 2004.232 The agency will not divulge the current number of
airports participating in the SPOT program but have indicated
that some airports across the country use SPOT full time, while
many others have used it on a trial basis. 233 The TSA will decide
whether to put SPOT into practice at all airports by the end of
2006.234
Whether the TSA has considered SPOT for GA airports is un-
clear, but legislation providing specific training 23 5 in BPR tech-
niques to the GA airport employees who often associate with
pilots, crew, and passengers could maximize threat detection ef-
forts.23 " More intense BPR training that goes beyond observa-
tional skills, such as that provided to law enforcement at the
Statue of Liberty, could be implemented at high-risk GA air-
ports. In addition to enhancing overall threat detection, BPR
techniques could also improve intelligence tracking at the law-
enforcement level to help identify patterns indicating possible
terrorist activity.237 Overall, it would be a relatively low-cost ap-
proach to improving GA airport security by involving more GA
employees in the threat-detection process.
22" AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF MASSACHUSETTS, RACIAL JUSTICE RE-
PORT 3 (2005), available at http://www.aclu-mass.org/pdf/RacialJustice.pdf.
231 See SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 24.
231 Tony DePaul, At T. F Green, Security Screeners Watch Behaviors to Detect Ter-





235 It has been suggested that local law-enforcement agencies or even criminal-
justice programs at nearby community colleges could provide the BPR training.
Olislagers, supra note 205, at 61.
2313 SECURING GENERAL AVIATION, supra note 3, at 24.
237 See id. at 17.
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In addition, the distribution of accurate, timely information
about potential threats to GA must be an integral part of any
security program. Although the TSA currently works through
the GA industry associations to communicate threat informa-
tion, the GAO found that the dissemination of this type of criti-
cal information is poor.238 The TSA sporadically issues security
advisories that are typically general in nature. 23 9 For risk com-
munication to be effective, it must convey the nature of the
threat, when and where it is likely to occur, over what time pe-
riod it is likely to occur, and guidance on actions to be taken.24 °
According to these risk communication principles, if the public
does not have ample threat information, they might ignore the
threat or act inappropriately, possibly even compromising the
public safety.241
The GAO also reported that the TSA's lack of good risk com-
munication could be the result of the TSA having to receive
threat information, often classified, from other federal agen-
cies. 24 2 The TSA claims that accumulating specific threat intelli-
gence is difficult because the threat posed by a terrorist group
changes as the terrorist group itself changes. 2" Different hierar-
chical structures, objectives, and capabilities within any given
terrorist group will vary the extent of the potential threat.244
Targets can also change when the security of the target varies.2 45
Although the TSA has managed to communicate classified
threat information to some GA industry groups, the agency is
still not able to fully ensure that the GA airport operators with
"need to know" status have the clearance to receive classified
threat information. 241  Furthermore, because GA operators are
flung among a diverse spectrum of airports that have never been
subject to much federal regulation, the contact information for
the owners or operators of airports may not be current or easily
accessible. In fact, neither the FAA nor the TSA keep any up-
dated database of GA airport operators.247
238 GENERAL AVIATION SECURITY: INCREASED FEDERAL OVERSIGHT, supra note 6,
at 19.
239 Id. at 4, 19.
240 Id. at 15.
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Therefore, any security initiative plan must contain a specific
outline of how the TSA is to attain threat information and most
effectively deliver it. Building an accurate and up-to-date con-
tact database of GA airport operators and owners is crucial and
could also assist the TSA in determining which airport operators
can receive classified information. Once the TSA has completed
threat assessments using its Transportation Risk Assessment and
Vulnerability Evaluation Tool, the Agency will have a better idea
of the exact dangers facing GA and consequently will be able to
communicate more helpful and specific threat information to
GA airport managers. 4 Moreover, after the security baselines
have been submitted by GA airports using the VISAT, the TSA
can identify the facilities whose contact information they most
need and the airport officials that could get clearance to receive
classified information.249 Intelligence about possible threats is
only helpful if it says what it needs to say and gets to those who
most need to hear it.
V. CONCLUSION
The time has come for policymakers to pair with industry offi-
cials and remedy the GA security situation, rather than continu-
ing to talk over each other and ignoring each other's goals and
objectives. They must ask and answer difficult questions, such as
what specific threats exist, where they are most likely to be acted
upon, and how to guard against them without imposing burden-
some, ill-fitting requirements onto the shoulders of individual
GA airports. They must reach a compromise between requiring
all GA airports, regardless of their individual characteristics, to
install expensive fencing, and continuing to lackadaisically as-
sume that GA can secure, enforce, and defend itself without any
mandated programs. The starting points are requiring the GA
airports to assess threat and risk levels, using that data to design
various security programs based on levels of potential for terror-
ist exploit, and engaging the industry groups to help implement
and tweak this framework. Security is the responsibility of every
American, and cooperation and communication is the key to
ensuring the safety of GA for years to come.
248 See id. at 23.
249 Id.
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